Aaron Kreider written July 20, 1996 retyped: November 7, 1996 The story of multipartism, the FPI and Signs of democracy in C“te d'Ivoire Introduction On April 30, 1990, the venerable president of thirty years, the honourable Felix Houphou‰t Boigny declared the political process open to competition. The era of multipartism had began! First out of the gate was the Front Populaire Ivorien (FPI) led by the veteran opposition figure: Laurent Gbagbo. Since the coming of multipartism there have been two sets of elections, and there are now as many parties as ethnic groups in C“te d'Ivoire! The PDCI is still firmly in power even with Houphou‰t's death, the opposition holds only a handful of seats, while the PDCI wins crushing majorities with methods that the opposition questions the true origins. Selling-Out for Power Felix Houphou‰t-Boigny has dominated Ivorian politics for almost fifty years; however, when he first go involved he acted like someone who today would be a strong FPI militant. In 1945 he was elected to the French Assembly to represent the Ivorians of C“te d'Ivoire. There he led the fight which resulted in the abolishment of forced labour and the indigen‚ant. In 1946 the Parti D‚mocratique de la C“te d'Ivoire (PDCI) was formed, initially with a very left-wing ideology, allying itself with African and French communists; however, in 1951 Houphou‰t sold-out the PDCI re-orienting it to be pro-French and moderate. In the Fifties, now no longer repressed by the French colonial power, the PDCI absorbed the other major parties and swept the Ivorian Assembly elections of 1957. The Abuses of the One Party State In October 31, 1960, C“te d'Ivoire became independent, but in fact merely transferred from France to Houphou‰t. C“te d'Ivoire was a one party state from the start, ruled by the PDCI under the presidency of "le sage". The one party state was theoretically meant to unite everyone to work for economic development, to avoid the waste of conflict of ideas and the possibility of democracy turning into purely tribal politics. Under "le vieux sage's" reign, domestic opponents were co-opted or eliminated if necessary, through the use of fictional plots (Gbagbo 46). In 1970, Kragb‚ Gnagb‚ attempted to start an opposition party. The result was a massacre of over 4000 people as the army, with possible French assistance, brutally clamped down on the resulting domestic discord in the Gagnoa area (Gbagbo 86). Laurent Gbagbo was personally a victim of Houphouet's regime. He was in a group of 400 students who were arrested in 1969 and jailed for 15 days because they supported a student organization that did not support the PDCI. In 1971 he was arrested for teaching a "wrong" view of history and kept in jail until 1973. Again in 1982, he was accused by the government in numerous communiqu‚s of inciting student unrest after the cancellation of a conference that he was in (Gbabgo 28). The government closed the universities and Gbagbo went in exile in France where he remained until 1989. Multipartism Comes In 1990, one party states, notably those in Eastern Europe were faced with a large popular movement for democracy. C“te d'Ivoire also faced popular unrest and public disapproval of the government. In response on April 30, 1990, president Houphou‰t opened up the country to multipartism. The Front Populaire Ivorien (FPI) immediately sprung to the challenge with a big march celebrating a "fˆte de libert‚" on May 1st in Abidjan (Gbagbo 95-96). The FPI's first challenge was raising the requested twenty million CFA to participate in the presidential election with only one week to do it (Bayard). 1990 Elections Other parties had been created, but the 1990 presidential race was fought solely between the PDCI's Houphouet-Boigny and the FPI's secretaire g‚neral: Laurent Gbabgo. According to official results Houphou‰t won a landslide with 82% to Gbagbo's 18% (Bayard). On the other hand, the FPI charged that the election was rigged and that the vote totals were modified somewhere along the route that takes them from voting bureau, to the sous-prefet, to the prefet, to the conseil consitutionnel, where they are finally announced (Bayard). For example, Laurent Gbagbo's result for Ouragahio in the subsequent Assembly elections was changed from 11000 votes to 3000 votes for his PDCI opponent, to a more acceptable win of 10000 to 5000 (Bayard). According to the procŠs verbaux that monitor the vote at the voting bureau level, the FPI claimed to have won with over 70% of the vote (Bayard). The government was not fazed and gave the PDCI (itself) another five years of power, winning 163 seats to only 9 for the FPI, 1 for the PIT, and 2 others. The resulting controversy set the stage for the events of 1995. 1995 elections: Changes since 1990 A lot changed in politics between the two elections with the death of Houphou‰t in 1993 and his succession by the president of the Assembly: Henri Konan Bedi‚. Houphouet's death resulted in a group breaking off from the PDCI and forming the centrist Rassemblement de D‚mocrates Republicains (RDR). Their leader was a former PDCI minister. There was also a new electoral code in place which specified, in a country of many immigrants, that not only does a presidential candidate have to be Ivorian, but so does both of their parents! To fight the elections of 1995, the opposition formed the Front Republicain, a tactical alliance consisting of the FPI, RDR, and several smaller parties. Origins of the boycot actif The Front Republicain chose one candidate to face-off with Bedi‚ in the coming presidential election: Allassane Dramane Ouahara. He was prime minister under Houphou‰t from 1990-1993, and in 1995 was vice-president of the IMF. Unfortunately for the Front Republicain, thanks to the pre- eminence of the PDCI and their newly created electoral code, M. Allassane was not qualified to run for president due to his parents' nationality even though he had been prime minister for three years! Also the Front was worried that the election would be stolen like in 1990 and thus they wanted some other changes to the electoral code such as making ballot boxes fully transparent and allowing party representatives at all stages of the vote counting process so that the vote total would not be modified (Bayard). The Front Republicain and the PDCI (or government) held talks and agreed to some minor changes; however the main objections of the Front were not met. Call to Boycott The Front Republicain was holding marches to protest the electoral code, but some people said the FPI could "marche dans les cieux" (Anne) and it would not do any good. So the Front Republicain gave the order for a boycott of the presidential election. This was not a simple abstention, but rather an entire strategy designed to mobilize its force, receive national and international media coverage when the PDCI government controlled the media: a "boycot actif" (Anne). This boycott effectively stopped the voting in many areas of C“te d'Ivoire and included a road blockade near Ouragahio (the people lay down in front of the military trucks, preferring to die rather than see the ballot boxes come), an FPI stronghold, and the tensions created led to confrontations between various ethnic groups and several deaths. Critique of the Boycott The FPI chose the boycot actif since the result of the election was already determined: Bedi‚ would win by fraud (Anne). The Front Republicain was criticized for stopping talks with the government and holding a boycott that led to violence and deaths (anonymous). The PDCI congratulated the government and police for remaining vigilant during the boycott, for if they had ever opened fire on demonstrators, it could have started a civil war (Simon). The PDCI blamed the numerous arrests on the high level of violence, as seen in incidents like the burning of the PDCI party's house in Ouragahio (Simon). The boycott was controversial, but partially effective. The result of the election was farcical with Bedi‚ winning with 95.25% of the vote against his only opponent: the leader of the Parti Ivorien de Travailleurs (PIT). Elections to be fought: The Assembly The Front Republicain decided to participate in the remaining legislative and municipal elections. The FPI and RDR had a partial tactical alliance, running a joint ticket in two districts and running only one ticket (either FPI or RDR) against the PDCI in 61 districts (see table 1). Table 1: Tactical Alliances in 1995 Assembly Elections Parties Contesting seat # seats FPI/RDR/PDCI/others 78 FPI/PDCI/others (no RDR) 52 RDR/PDCI/others (no FPI) 9 PDCI only 9 PDCI/others 4 postponed 3 Front Republicain/PDCI 2 *source : La Voie, November 21, 1995, page 6. M. Emile Constant Bombet, minister of the Interior, postponed the elections in Ouragahio, Gagnoa, and Guib‚roua (all FPI strongholds) due to a "situation d'insecurit‚" until December of 1996 (qtd. in l'Alternative, march 9-10 1996). There was once again evidence of fraud in the voting lists, bribing of voters, intimidation, and people voting in districts where they did not live (la Patrie, Feb 27 1996). The result of the fraud and the partial division of the opposition was a crushing PDCI victory, in the elections of November 27, with 145 seats to 14 for the RDR and 11 for the FPI. The FPI will most likely sweep the three races that were postponed, giving them as many seats as the RDR. The Municipals The municipal elections were held February 11, 1996. The Front Republicain was more unified and did better; however the PDCI still won 158 of the 195 municipalities. Ouragahio, showing proof of its status as an FPI stronghold, re-elected an FPI mayor with 82.8% to 17.2% for the PDCI. An article in l'Alternative of Feb 16-18, mentions fraud in the elections by disappearing ballot boxes, falsified voter rolls, and bribed voters. Once again the election process was controversial and questions of whether C“te d'Ivoire is a real democracy or only a state which allows multiple parties. Ethnicity and Politics The FPI is the party of the B‚t‚ and the PDCI is for the Baoul‚s. The more recently created RDR represents the Dyula and Malink‚ who are concentrated in the north (ex. Korhogo). Houphou‰t was Baoul‚ and his successor Bedi‚ just happens also to be Baoul‚ as are 29 out of 36 ministers in his government (Bayard). Regarding inter-ethnic tensions, a PDCI Baoul‚ said "seulement que nous n'avons pas les mˆmes partis politiques, sinon nous sommes des frŠres". Another clarified this by saying that they are our brothers but they have "le sang chaud". The said the B‚t‚ wanted to win to get the privileges that the Baoul‚s were supposedly enjoying. They were critical, but all agreed that a B‚t‚ could rule C“te d'Ivoire. Anne, of the OFFPI, denied that the FPI was a B‚t‚ party and argued that all reasonable people should vote for them and their program. She said the gendarmes and the administration sided with the Baoul‚s and when someone talks about power they think we're talking about them (that is the Baoul‚s think that) (Anne). There are exceptions, for example Simon (who had the only two story house in Ouragahio) was a B‚t‚ who said that everyone in Gagnoa and Ouragahio used to be PDCI until they saw "un frŠre B‚t‚" (ie Laurent Gbagbo) and decided that the FPI was their party. Simon supports the PDCI due to their ideology and program. Ideology of the Political Parties Quite simply the PDCI is right-wing, the RDR centrist, and the FPI left-wing. The PDCI is in favour of economic liberalism and capitalist development according to the policies of the World Bank and IMF. The RDR is also centrist, but opposes the current government and supports greater democracy. The FPI is socialist and member of the international group of left-wing parties: the Socialist International (Bayard). The FPI is criticized for its adoption of socialism, supposedly a failed doctrine as seen in the former USSR and in France among other examples (Simon). The FPI has for over six years had a program for government that shows the contrast between their ideology and that of the ruling PDCI. FPI's Program (per M. Bayard) 1. Supports government involvement in strategic economic sectors. 2. Redistribute wealth, help the poor. 3. Reform the education system to reduce cheating. 4. Agriculture: allow peasants to sell their own produce or pay them at least 50% of the world price (instead of the 20- 30% they currently get) by the government with the rest used for sickness and retirement benefits and governmental revenues. 5. Create technical schools for children who fail regular school. 6. Cut government waste. Example: one minister has six cars. 7. Improve the health care system. Conclusion According to official figures the PDCI is supremely popular in C“te d'Ivoire and all opposition would seem near futile; however, the Ivorian opposition has made remarkable gains, show signs of unity, and demonstrated that it can govern at least at the municipal level. Perhaps the day will come when C“te d'Ivoire is truly a democracy and the president is not necessarily a Baoul‚ and/or from the PDCI! "Nous n'avons conquis que le multipartisme. Il reste … conqu‚rir la democratie, le pouvoir d'Etat, et … d‚montrer nos capacit‚s … g‚rer le pays" (Gbagbo 15). Works Cited L'Alternative, March 9-10, 1996, p. 2. Anne Zouogbo Hou‚tro. Secr‚taire de Section OFFPI. Interviewed June, 1996. Annonymous. Interview of a person who wished to remain anonymous. June 29, 1996 Bayard, Ourigbale. Sec‚taire g‚n‚rale de section FPI. June 24, 1996 Gbagbo, Laurent. C“te d'Ivoire: Agir pour les Libert‚s. l'Harmattan: Paris, 1991. Gbagbo, Laurent. Pour une Alternative D‚mocratique. l'Harmattan: Paris, 1983. La Patrie au Quotidien, Feb 27, 1996, p. 2-3. PDCI women, Interview, July 3, 1996. Simon, Dj‚dj‚. Secr‚taire Permanent PDCI-RDA. July 14, 1996. La Voie. Nov. 27, 1995. p. 6. Done with a lot of newspaper clippings and help from interviews and two books. La Voie is an FPI paper that was banned and had to change its name to l'Alternative for a month to avoid that ban (it used the same color and looked very similar). We tried interviewing someone high up in the PDCI who had an absolutely huge house and had ran for mayor of Ouragahio twice, but we were unable (perhaps he was too busy). FPI people talked really willingly (while Simon of the PDCI wanted us to talk to people higher up first). Written with personal bias since the PDCI government made Keith Swartzendruber and I get permission from the Minster of the Interior to be in that area, taking about three weeks (we got bored).