International Political Science Lee Roy Berry by Aaron Kreider Date due: Thursday, December, 1 Introduction or Purpose This papers first set outs to determine the current state of the world political system, its recent history and where it is heading. From there, it will discuss the crisis experienced in Haiti with the overthrow of democratically elected president Jean Bertrand Aristide, and the events leading up to his restoration. Past World System: Comments on Bipolarity and its decline The recent bipolarity of the world is important as the current world political system is strongly affected by its recent past status. Freedman argues that the bipolarity of the Cold War created stability because due to mutual assured destruction theory, neither side could win in case of total war (23). The two superpowers competed, to win over small states to their coalition to tilt the balance of power their way to improve their national security. Every state was viewed as important, including small islands like Grenada that the U.S. felt necessary to invade in 1982. In the Cold War era the two major powers cooperated in a sense to avoid nuclear war, and had a tactical agreement not to use nuclear weapons to win conventional wars. There were not any direct wars between the major powers of the world because of the threat of nuclear holocaust. The two coalitions had to be rock solid to ensure their security, so eastern Europe was lined up solidly behind USSR and the West was equally fully backing of the U.S.. The end of bipolarity allows their allies, the lesser powers, more freedom of action in the new emerging world system. The Emerging World Political System A new world political system is emerging out of the bipolar one that existed since World War II. The rise of the unipolar system is entirely due to the decline of the former USSR, rather than the rise of the U.S. (Freedman 26). Nationalism is on the rise in former communist states and elsewhere in the world. Civil wars, and ethnic disputes are now primary events on the world political stage. The rich developed states have to decide how to deal with poverty and instability in the rest of the world (Freedman 22). The global system is currently divided between the North and the South (Freedman 24). Freedman views the U.S., Japan, and EC as a unitary hegemonic power, with each having their separate spheres of influence (27). Outside their regions of influence it does not matter as much what happens to a poor country, because there is no longer a need to build global coalitions and no other viable models are prospering besides that of western capitalism (Freedman 27). Unipolarity Charles Krauthammer argues that the current world political system is unipolar (23). The West, composed mostly of the United States, is the hegemonic power. Multipolarity may be the way of the future; however, the current system is solidly unipolar (Krauthammer 24). The U.S. has taken an increasingly hegemonic role over the past five years, since the decline of communism. Lawrence Freedman thinks that "The United States has attained an international preeminence beyond challenge" (20). The power of the U.S. is evident in their intervention in the affairs of other sovereign states despite the American public's reluctance to do so. U.S. Military Interventions that Prove its Hegemony "In every quarter other nations acknowledged that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as the only functioning superpower and that the ideas it espoused were increasingly triumphant." (Gergen 1) The Persian Gulf war, Haiti, Panama, and Yugoslavia have all to an extent demonstrated the leadership role of the United States in the world political system. In the Persian Gulf war, the U.S. took firm action and resolved the crisis. In former Yugoslavia, the European states have failed to deal with a crisis in their own backyard because the U.S. did not take firm leading action. Haiti is another example of a crisis that the U.S. made a top priority. The U.S. took action and restored Aristide with an American dominated multinational force. The U.S. invasion of Panama demonstrated its "police role" in the Americas, as Panama's sovereignty was violated without major international disapproval. The U.S. army is the only one in the world that has such a long list of successful interventions in recent history. The U.S. military, equipped with the best technology in the world, can completely overpower small states without endangering its troops. Intervention Intervention has taken on an important role in the new world political system. Instead of intervening on the behalf of one's ideology and coalition, intervention now can serve a humanitarian role. However, Freedman gives some reasons why states believe that military intervention could fail: "On the basis of their experience outside Europe, they are well aware of the perils of getting sucked into the quagmires of regional conflicts where allies are likely to be erratic and corrupt, interests vague and insubstantial, and the best intentions wholly counterproductive." (32-33) The West is becoming less keen to military measures and prefers peaceful economic and political sanctions to war. However, nonmilitary measures do not always have the strength to work. Intervention is now more likely based on idealism and is imposed by the greater powers on the lesser ones. It will be necessary to intervene in the future, despite the difficulties involved, to prevent states from developing of weapons of mass destruction (Freedman 34,36). Second Place Powers: Possibilities and Weaknesses Europe is too divided to create effective unified foreign policy, while Japan and Germany show only small signs of acting independently (Krauthammer 24). Of the other nuclear powers, England and France are solidly behind the United States as western capitalist democracies, while China is liberalizing its economy and headed for closer relations with the U.S. Germany and Japan are both rising powers, especially in economic strength. However all of the powers are a long way off from matching the U.S.'s military strength, and while they may be closing in, they still have not displayed their interest in challenging the leadership of the U.S.. The True Lack of UN Power The United Nations does not have power in itself, unless that power is conferred to it by its members. The most powerful member of the UN is the U.S. The U.S. must be the major force behind any UN action for it to succeed. China, Russia, England, and France can also veto any Security Council resolution if their interests are offended. Krauthammer claims that the UN cannot guarantee the national security of its member states, and that it is used by the U.S. as a vehicle to improve the image of intervention to increase the popular support for such a mission (25-26). Even so, the UN will take a larger lead in world affairs (Freedman 22). Its increased effectiveness will be due to the leadership of the U.S., which can coerce many states to back them, while such a majority was not possible in the Cold War due to the confrontation between the two opposing world views: capitalism and communism. Future Possibilities for the World Political System The United States is the major power presently, but the world political system is always in flux. Japan and Germany are rising economic powers, and China with its 1.1 billion people and its recent liberalization of its economy will grow more powerful as time passes. The United States might look inwards and plan to deal with domestic issues. Clinton ran an election campaign that could be summarized with the catch phrase: "It's the economy stupid!" But he ended up intervening in Haiti, and involved in the former Yugoslavia, and now he's trying to pass GATT. "'Put America First' is a dangerous old slogan, but considering the decade's realities it is not altogether wrong."(Hyland 52). Future U.S. role It is the probable that the United States will go against two hundred years of history, and adapt a foreign policy with humanitarian goals as well as national security ones. The U.S. could try to promote democracy and human rights. It could work miracles with relatively minute amounts of aid. It could take a stance against authoritarian governments that it had previously supported. The U.S. will try to create conditions under which global free trade will boost its economy. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction might require the U.S. to take action as a hegemonic power capable of dealing with "renegade" states (Krauthammer 32-33). Or the U.S. might be able to reduce states' desire for such weapons by creating a better world political system in which states are more reliant on each other. How the US should have dealt with the overthrow of Aristide The United States had to deal with the question of intervention in the the case of the Haitian coup. Impartiality is the usual policy used in crises requiring external intervention (Betts 28). A state tries to intervene, and negotiate or keep the peace between warring sides, by acting as a neutral third party. Betts argues that intervention can be more successful if it is in favour of one of the parties in the dispute (28). The United States should have been totally supportive of Aristide. He had an undeniable claim to the presidency of Haiti, and an overwhelming popular mandate. Though he was a radical, he would have succumbed to moderating pressures from the U.S. government and the international lenders, as most other leaders of underdeveloped nations are forced to do. Haiti is clearly in the United State's sphere of influence, so there was not much action that other powers should do, other then aiding the U.S. in the restoration of Aristide. The U.S. should have supported Aristide and placed severe pressures on the rulers of Haiti to abdicate. The military regime would have been forced to compromise, or face defeat after a US military invasion. The United States should have first used economic and diplomatic sanctions on Haiti, and then considered the use of force. Though Haiti is a small and seemingly unimportant state, it was crucial for the U.S. to act because of their new approach to foreign policy that has a humanitarian component. "As a candidate, Clinton has declared that 'no national security issue is more urgent than securing democracy's triumph around the world."(Smith 40) U.S. actions in Haiti will result in better relations with Latin America (Smith 36). Also encouraging democracy will lead to greater stability of the world political system, U.S. security, and greater global economic cooperation (Smith 37-38). Haitian History up to the coup There were two times in history that the Haitian people were solidly behind something. One of them was the rebellion against slavery and French rule from 1791-1804, and the other time was the election of Aristide with two-thirds of the vote (Trouillot 46). In 1789 Saint-Domingue was an extremely profitable colony producing large quantities of sugar and coffee. However, the conditions for the slaves were terrible and they revolted in August of 1791. In 1803, Haiti abolished slavery and became the first truly free state in the Americas. It was ignored by the other states, and the U.S. did not recognize Haiti until sixty years later. The government exploited the peasants by taxing their produce, such as coffee, at a rate equivalent to 40% of their income. Massive election fraud, ensured that the peasants remained powerless (Trouillot 48). The U.S. occupation of 1915-1934, failed to lift the country out of poverty or create a middle class. It left a U.S. trained army, a powerful state structure, and 15,000 dead Haitians. The U.S. occupation created a state that was easy for a dictator to control and left a military that was to play a dominant role in politics (Trouillot 49). François Duvalier, fraudulently elected in 1957, used the authoritarian centralized state to systematically oppress his opponents (Trouillot 50). He was succeeded by his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, in 1971. Duvalierism is very important in Haiti. People remember the oppression. The military and many politicians are still under its influence (Trouillot 51). The Role of the Haitian People The people have played an important role in overthrowing their government when it abused its powers to an unbearable extent. The popular movement consisting of peasant groups, students, unions, and religious groups, caused Jean-Claude Duvalier to flee the country in Feb. 7, 1986, by a mass uprising. Popular struggle forced General Prosper Avil to resign in March of 1990, allowing for elections. The new government was an alliance of moderates and Duvalierists. This alienated the popular movement (Aristide 34). Aristide entered the elections very late, and under a united coalition of middle class and the popular movement he swept two-thirds of the vote, against the U.S. backed former World Bank employee, who only got about 15%. On January 7, 1991 there was a coup attempt by the Duvalierist who came in third place in the election, but it failed when the people took to the streets. The popular forces increased their strength under Aristide's government before the coup that overthrew him in September, 1991 (Aristide 36). The Role of Internal Forces in the U.S. The Tenth Department is a term created by Aristide to describe the 1.5 million Haitians living outside Haiti. They emigrated to flee the oppression of the Duvalier regimes, and then again in the aftermath of the coup (Jean-Pierre 42-43). Haitians enjoy continuously debating politics and as a result there are many diverse small political groups outside Haiti (Jean-Pierre 43). The Tenth department raised 2/3 of Aristide's campaign money, and also put pressure on Clinton, for whom they voted, with demonstrations for the return of Aristide (Jean-Pierre 44-45). They and the Congressional Black Caucus were instrumental in placing pressure on Clinton that helped push the US government to take action to restore Aristide. The U.S. Role The U.S. only reluctantly supported Aristide, and also made moves in favour of the Haitian military. The U.S. secret service actually encouraged Emmanuel Constant to form FRAPH, the death squad notorious for the many human rights abuses (Nairn 346). The U.S. will not persecute all of the human rights abusers in the military, and has been a notable supporter of an amnesty for all of the abusers (Nairn 346). Cedras and Michel Francois, head of the brutal military police, received U.S. military training. Further U.S. training for the army will not stop human rights abuses (Nairn 346). The U.S. regards the Haitian poor as their true enemy, and is afraid of a popular revolt (Nairn 348). The U.S.'s goal was to preserve military, while Aristide was interested in reforming it (Mandelbraum 77). The major component of the UN intervention force was American to soothe the Haitian military's fears about the UN (Mandelbraum 77). The United States wants to keep the military intact and powerful enough to keep Aristide in line. This would ensure that he follows a more moderate and pro-U.S. agenda than he would otherwise choose. The U.S. intervened to stop the flow of illegal refugees, to end the human rights abuses that were happening in Haiti, and to present a better international image of itself as a "promoter of democracy". The Coup and initial reactions On September 30, 1991, Aristide was overthrown in a military coup by General Raoul Cedras. Several days later, Secretary State James Baker made a statement in favour of the return of Aristide, which he later reversed, stating that Aristide may never return. The OAS also made a statement denouncing the coup. Support for Aristide was high in the Americas and in United States. On October 11, 100,000 Haitians rallied in New York city in support of Aristide. Bush waited around, and then on November 5, he decided that the U.S. would observe the oil embargo on Haiti recommended by the OAS. The embargo was subsequently very poorly enforced (Ives 17). Aristide had a choice of two strategies. Either he would have to accept a U.S. intervention, or mobilize the people of Haiti to actively oppose the military government (Ives 17). With the advice of his moderate supporters, Aristide gradually went down the path of intervention (Ives 17). He decided to seek a settlement with the military powers in Haiti (Ives 17-18). He was going to rely on the "New World Order", and hope that the United States had changed their foreign policy to include humanitarian objectives as important. U.S. Policy under the Bush Administration The Bush Administration did not treat Aristide favourably. They tended to side with the Haitian military. On October 4 and 5, an OAS mission to Port-au-Prince talked to supporters of the coup. But instead of telling Cedras to leave as they had promised, they returned to the U.S. condemning Aristide. They had not discussed any of the current human rights abuses that were occurring in Haiti. Members of the Haitian parliament, who generally supported the coup, met with Aristide in Colombia in November, and proposed continuing talks if the embargo were lifted. The U.S. agreed to the deal, but Aristide refused and was made to look intransigent. During November and December, a representative from the OAS and the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, held more meetings with the parliamentarians. The prime minister of Haiti, an Aristide supporter, R‚n‚ Pr‚val, was forced to resign by U.S. and media pressure, for being too radical. The U.S. ambassador and the representative of the OAS, coerced Aristide into choosing between Marc Bazin, the U.S. backed former presidential candidate, and R‚n‚ Th‚odore, otherwise the embargo might be lifted. R‚n‚ Th‚odore, was an opponent of Aristide, but he became prime minister on January 8, 1992. The U.S. had planned for Aristide to return as a figurehead, several months after the prime minister, with the real power in the government, had been installed. On January 25 Th‚odore's bodyguard was killed by Duvalierist forces who wanted to ensure that Aristide did not return, putting another blow to Aristide's chances (Ives 20-21). In February, the U.S. decided to allow U.S. light-manufacture businesses to operate in Haiti. On February 23, the "Protocol of Accord" was agreed to by Aristide and some Duvalierists. It included an amnesty for everybody, a promise by Aristide to abide by all of the regime's parliament's decisions after the coup, which meant that C‚dras would be head of the army until 1994, and the embargo was to end after a coalition government had been formed and a prime minister confirmed. The popular movement opposed the deal, which was clearly weighted heavily in the Haitian military's favour, with the return of Aristide not even mentioned. Aristide later argued that C‚dras would still be liable for prosecution under the agreement, and the agreement quickly dissolved. On May 24, Bush told the Coast Guard to repatriate any Haitian refugees or "boat people", whom it picks up. The military regime proposed the "Villa d'Accueil" agreement, under which a coalition government of Aristide supporters and Duvalierists would be formed under the prime ministership of Marc Bazin. Marc Bazin became the regime's prime minister on June 10. Also in June, at the "Miami Meeting" moderate supporters of Aristide made up a coalition government proposal to start negotiations between Aristide and the Haitian military regime (Ives 23). US Policy under the Clinton Administration The U.S.'s position tilted away from the military towards Aristide with the election of Clinton in November 1992; however, the refugee policy of returning boat people remained in place (Ives 24). In March, 250 UN Civilian Mission Human Rights observers were sent to Haiti, but the level of violence was still on the increase. On April 23, Clinton proposed a force of between five and six hundred "multinational police force" to "professionalize" the army, in a step towards military intervention. The regime's prime minister, Marc Bazin, resigned on June 8. On June 16, the Security Council passed Resolution 841 requiring a worldwide arms and oil embargo, and a freeze of financial assets starting June 23. The popular movement of Haiti, began to fear that the Security Council would control the agenda and that they would act solely in the U.S.'s interest (Ives 25). Due to what seemed to be the pressure from the new sanctions, the Governor's Island Accord was signed by Aristide and C‚dras in New York, on July 3 (Harton 81). The accord proposed the end to sanctions, an amnesty, reform of the Haitian military, and C‚dras agreed to retire from his post before Aristide's return on October 30. Aristide was reluctant to sign the deal, and deliberated for one day while he was pressured into accepting it. C‚dras's supporters celebrated the accord when he returned to Haiti. The popular movement opposed it. Aristide appointed Robert Malval prime minister, on August 27, as required by the accord. Sanctions were meanwhile lifted by UN Security Council Resolution 861. Monday, Oct. 11, two hundred U.S. and Canadian troops, on board the USS Harlan Count, were due to land in Haiti. However, due to a small demonstration of about a hundred Haitians associated with FRAPH (Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti) they decided not to land. At the same time, Haiti was being compared to Somalia where the U.S. intervention was perceived to have failed (H84). People were concerned for the safety of the U.S. troops (Harton 85). Senator Bob Dole stated after the failure of the Governor's Island Accord, "The return of Aristide to Haiti is not worth even one American life." (Ives 29) General C‚dras decided not to retire on October 15, laying to rest any chance that the accord would be resurrected. Within several days, the UN police monitors and the UN/OAS human rights monitors left. The U.S.'s policy in Haiti had just collapsed, due to their doubts about intervention and Aristide. Mounting Pressure on the Haitian Military After the stunning failure in October to restore Aristide, momentum built up gradually during the first half of 1994 for his return. In January, human rights observers were sent back to Haiti. In January 14, 1994, the "Miami Conference" was held, to put Aristide under pressure to compromise with the military regime. The violence continued unabated in Haiti. Repatriation of boat refugees continued, with the refugees targets for violence upon their return. Aristide decided to refuse the U.S. permission to repatriate the boat refugees, so the U.S. established a camp for them in Guantanamo Bay and on several ships. On May 6, 1994, Security Council Resolution 917 implemented a ban on air travel, a complete travel ban for the Haitian military and supporters of the coup, the freezing of their financial assets, and a trade blockade of Haiti except for humanitarian supplies on May 21. The resolution called for the implementation of the Governor's Island Accord. Links are being made between the Haitian military and the drug trade to discredit them. On July 31, 1994, Security Council Resolution 940, "authorizes Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership...". The UN was moving towards a multinational military intervention or even invasion force in Haiti. Aristide, in another sign of his moderatization, agreed in August to the IMF and World Bank's economic plan for the country in return for deeply needed aid. He was forced to change his original economic plans to help the poor, due to Haiti's financial straits. The Accord In August and early September, the United States government was growing increasingly belligerent and began to threaten military intervention in Haiti. It became clear several days before the Accord was signed, that invasion was imminent. Clinton was sending signals loud and clear to the public that the U.S. would invade unless the Haitian military caved in. However, a last ditch intensive peace effort led by Jimmy Carter, concluded in the signing of the "Accord" on September 18th. They finally reached the agreement, when the regime discovered that the U.S. had ordered preparations for an invasion of Haiti while they were negotiating. The U.S. was telling the regime that it would it would be crushed, unless it caved in. When presented with the U.S. ultimatum, the military reached an agreement with the U.S. only about an hour away from being invaded. The agreement was generally very vague. It called for cooperation between the U.S. and Haitian military, it lifted the sanctions on Haiti, and it vaguely stated that "certain military officers of the Haitian Armed Forces are willing to consent to an early and honorable retirement...", after a "general amnesty" is brought into effect. The firm resolve of the United States led to a resolution of the crisis, and several thousand troops landed in Haiti the day after the accord was signed. 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