Aaron Kreider Documented Argument March 22, 1995 Final Draft United States Intervention in Central America A new era of world politics has started as old threats fade away and new ones ascend on the horizon. In this new world political system the United States has increased its power, as its main opponent, the former Soviet Union, has declined. To predict how the United States will act with its new freedom one can look at the relationship between the US and its neighbours to the south where the US has historically been free to act as it wished. What one sees is not the US trying to intervene to save democracy, but rather the US government concentrating on maintaining its status, power, and popularity at the brutal expense of loss of life and freedom for the people of Latin America. The US shows little respect for legality and its intervention hurts democracy and international law in the long-run. This historical selfish policy has been in place since Latin American independence. It is evident in the US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and more recently in the US invasion of Panama in 1989. US Historical Role in Latin America The US historical role in Latin America can be summed up by a statement Simon Boliv r made in 1829. Just several years after liberating Latin America, he predicted, "the United States [seems] destined to plague and torment the continent in the name of freedom" (qtd. in Chomsky 58, from Kiernan 1978). He was reacting to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 that transferred the dominance of Latin America from Europe to America (Chomsky 59). The United States, acting as an imperialist power, rapidly became active in Latin America, gaining territory including Cuba, Texas, and California (Needler 16). Land became less important an objective at the turn of the century, but force remained the primary tool of policy (Needler 16,18). For example in 1903 the US created Panama by separating it from Colombia (Maechling 113). A year later, the US declared the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe doctrine, which stated that the United States, as a "civilized" state, should be free to intervene to promote order in any Latin American country (Keen 524). During the Teens and Twenties the US frequently intervened to protect its own interests in Latin America, the Marines landed in Honduras in 1907, in Nicaragua in 1910, in Panama in 1912, and the US military occupied Haiti from 1915-1934 (Grossman 2). The exception was a brief lapse in US interventionism in 1930 when the government became increasingly isolationist and stopped enforcing the Roosevelt Corollary on its southern neighbours; however, the end of the Second World War changed the situation as a new threat to the United States was found (Maechling 114). The Anti-"Communism" Period After World War Two, the United States grew paranoid about its national security and the "communist threat" as McCarthyism swept the nation. Guatemala's foreign minister Toriello clarified the meaning of "communism", explaining that the US was "cataloguing as 'Communism' every manifestation of nationalism or economic independence, any desire for social programs, any intellectual curiosity, and any interest in progressive or liberal reforms" (qtd. in Chomsky 52). In a typical example of US foreign policy during the period, the democratically elected government of Guatemala was overthrown with US support in 1954, several years after Toriello's statement. The US wanted Latin America to be, as Secretary of War Patterson put it in January 1947, "a stable, secure, and friendly flank . . . not confused by enemy penetration, political, economic, or military." (qtd. in Chomsky 64) However, economic progress in Latin America led to people asserting their right to increased political power (Needler 8). Unfortunately expressions of popular will were suppressed as shown in the overthrow of the democratic government of Guatemala in 1954, of the Dominican Republic in 1962, and of Chile in 1973. The US southern flank was far from stable. Supporters who sought to reinstate democratic governments, groups who struggled against authoritarian regimes, and people who only wanted to improve their meager standard of living were targeted as the source of instability and were all labeled communists. A very unfortunate aspect of the predominance of anticommunism in US foreign policy was the resulting US support for anticommunist dictators and regimes whose human rights abuses were abhorrent. Noam Chomsky explained that one can learn about the US by looking at its actions in Latin America: "The picture we see is not a pretty one. The region is one of the world's most awful horror chambers, with widespread starvation, semi-slave labor, torture and massacre by US clients" (Chomsky 4). The US military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 was typical of the period. The irrational fear of communist influence in the republic caused the US to oppose the democratic forces and support the rule of the conservative elite. US Intervention in Dominican Republic Background Since 1930 the Dominican Republic had been under the dictatorial rule of Trujillo supported by the US trained National Guard (Chomsky 148). In his brutal rule of over thirty years, he and several US corporations had acquired control of the country's economy (Pearce 62, qtd. in Chomsky 150). After his assassination, a fair presidential election was held in 1962 and won by Juan Bosch, who was a leftist but hardly a communist (Needler 81, 82). Joaqu¡n Balaguer, a former vice president under Trujillo's government, came in second (Needler 81, 82). Noam Chomsky details the US opposition to the progressive Bosch government: US officials (whose word was law) prevented Bosch from removing hostile officers who controlled the armed forces, blocked agrarian reforms, and with the assistance of US labor leaders, forestalled his efforts to develop a strong, united, labor movement. (Chomsky 150) Bosch worked for the poor and oppressed, reduced privilege and reformed government, but seven months after being elected he was overthrown by the military (Gleiveses 88 & 97, qtd. in Chomsky 151). After the coup, a civilian government administrated the country, but separate plots to overthrow it were hatched by both the military and Bosch's supporters (Needler 82, 84). On April 24, 1995, the plots erupted into a rebellion and the country fell into a civil war (Needler 85, 86). The military, who supported Balaguer, gained the initial advantage over the Constitution forces, supporters of Juan Bosch the last democratically elected president (Needler 86). Several days later the rebel Constitutional forces were winning with the help of several leftist groups (Needler 87). The war raged on for several days and the US embassy became convinced that "a return of Dr. Bosch would mean 'communism in Dominican Republic in six months' [and] that US forces would have to be used in support of General Wessin's [leader of the military] troops if the pro-Bosch rebellion was to be defeated (Szulc 19). The US could not permit the Dominican Republic to go communist and the civil war grew chaotic threatening the lives of Americans in the Dominican Republic (Szulc 30). The Dominican military command called on the US to intervene, and the US ambassador sided with the military, claimed US citizens were in danger, and recommended that the US government take action (Szulc 45). US Intervention On the night of April 28, 1965, the US marines landed in the Dominican Republic, supported the Dominican military, and clashed with the Constitutional forces (Chomsky 152). The US intervention gave the Dominican military a psychological boost, allowing them a free reign in gaining control of the countryside, while the rebels were pent-up in the capital (Needler 88). A compromise interim government was established and Balaguer fraudulently won the newly held presidential election (Chomsky 152). Conclusions on the Intervention The United States succeeded in preventing democracy and liberty from taking a firm hold in the Dominican Republic. It established a conservative anticommunist government, under the ageing leadership of Balaguer, that is still intact today. The US government saw the military intervention as a failure, criticized the CIA for overestimating the communist threat and underestimating the gravity of the situation in the Dominican Republic before the rebellion occurred (Needler 91). Chomksy explained the dismal results of the intervention: The result [for the Dominican Republic] was the usual one: death squads, torture, repression, an increase in poverty and malnutrition for the mass of the population, slave labor conditions, vast emigration, and outstanding opportunities for US investors, whose control over the economy reached new heights. (Chomsky 152) This support of anticommunist leadership without regard for democracy was typical of US policy during the era of communism and superpower cold war politics. US Role in a Post-Communist World Latin American countries have slowly been converting from military regimes to democracies, and the United States now has the option of strengthening democratic forces in the Americas without any danger of a communist takeover. For instance, Latin American rebel groups have made peace with the military in countries like El Salvador and Nicaragua. Nicaragua, a former US enemy, is now turning to the US for economic assistance (Uhlig 105). The US now has less need to protect its national security as military threats have fallen dramatically with the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, the United States is now the only super power in the world, with a correspondingly greater freedom to pursue its interests than ever before. The US interventionist tendency has been shown recently by American use of force in Haiti, Iraq, Somalia, and Panama. In 1989 the US was looking for new enemies and was in need of a small military conflict to discard President George Bush's image of being a wimp. In 1989 the United States discovered Manuel Noriega. US invasion of Panama Background Panama was originally created by the US in 1903 so that they could build a canal between the Pacific and the Atlantic Ocean. Noriega, Panama's defacto leader, was in league with the US, the CIA, and the Drug Enforcement Agency until 1986 (Maechling 116). In June 1987 violent popular demonstrations erupted in the streets, due to reports of election fraud and Noriega's involvement in major human rights abuses (Maechling 116). In February 1988, Noriega was charged by the US courts with aiding in the trafficking of drugs between Colombia and the US (Maechling 116). The president of Panama subsequently fired Noriega from commander of the Panamanian Defense Force. The National Assembly replaced the president with a supporter of Noriega (Maechling 116). The US refused to recognize the new president and placed massive economic pressure on Panama by cutting off US aid, freezing all Panamanian assets in the US, and ceasing transfers from US to Panamanian corporations (Maechling 117). Tension had been mounting for the past several years, as the US had to relinquish to Panama the right to appoint the head of the Panama Canal Commission by January 1, 1990 (Maechling 120). In September 1989, after the expiration of a term, a new Panamanian president and assembly came into power (Maechling 121). On October 3, as dissatisfaction with Noriega rose and as the economic pressures increased, a coup was attempted by the military against Noriega (Maechling 121). The US was still refusing to recognize the defacto Panamanian government, continuing economic pressure, and was planning an invasion. By December 15, the situation was so difficult that the National Assembly declared that Panama was in a "state of war" with the US, and they appointed Noriega supreme leader (Maechling 121). Tensions mounted and during the following days there were several isolated clashes between US and Panamanian troops (Maechling 121). The Invasion At 1AM on December 20, 1989, 24000 US troops invaded Panama. They met little resistance but the intervention resulted in over 300 Panamanian deaths and over one thousand injuries (Maechling 121). Noriega surrendered to US forces fifteen days later and was taken to prison in the US (Maechling 121,122). Noriega had been transformed from a friendly leader into a hated monster in several months (Economist 25). According to a Gallup/Newsweek poll, 80% of Americans supported the invasion (D 25). Conclusions and Post-Invasion Disorder While the invasion was popular, it also violated international law and set back the gains that international law had been making in inter-state relations (Maechling 130). According to Article 18 of the revised Organization of American States'(O.A.S.) Charter, of which the US is a member, "No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or externa l affairs of any other state" (Maechling 114-115). The US invasion was condemned by a vote of 75-25 in the UN General Assembly and a landslide of 20-1 in an O.A.S. vote (Maechling 125). The invasion may have provided short-term benefits for the US, though the effect on the drug trade was little if any (Economist 25). However in the long run its consequences for the integrity of the world political system and the principles of international law negate any benefits (Maechling 131). George Bush's expressed reasons for invading were to safeguard democracy, save American lives, protect the Panama Canal, and to capture Noriega (Maechling 122). However Panama was not near democratic, American citizens were in minimal danger, the canal was not threatened at any point by the Panamanian military and the act of capturing Noriega broke international law (Maechling 120,123,125). Richard Barnet explained the real US rational for the invasion: It was a made-to-order occasion for muscle flexing: a central-casting villain . . . who made clumsy threats and shed American blood; a relatively low cost military operation to convince taxpayers that the $300 billion military budgets of recent years actually buy something you can use; a military victory for a commander in chief who was still suspected of wimpishness; and a glorious moment in the war against drugs - Bush finally got his man (Barnet 73). Conclusion Communism is dead or at least barely kicking. The United States is now at a moment in time when it can modify its foreign policy position concerning the Americas and the world as a whole. It remains to be seen if the US will continue to intervene to maintain its power and to answer domestic concerns, as in its intervention in the Dominican Republican and Panama. A better option, would be for the US to favour freedom and liberty at the expense of a loss in their power and dominance. This would allow a long term global dividend in peace, prosperity, and respect for international law. Works Cited Barnet, Richard J. "Bush's Splendid Little War." Nation 22 Jan. 1990: 73, 76-77. Chomksy, Noam. Turning the Tide. Boston: South End Press, 1985. Grossman, Zoltan. "Over a Century of U.S. Military Interventions." NY Transfer News Collective 1 Jan. 1995: 1-5. Keen, Benjamin. A History of Latin America. Boston, Toronto: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992. Maechling, Charles Jr. "Washington's Illegal Invasion." Foreign Policy Summer 1990: 113-131. Needler, Martin C. United States and the Latin American Revolution. Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publications, 1977. "St George and the Bogeyman." Economist 6 Jan. 1990:25-26. Szulc, Tad. Dominican Diary. New York: Delacorte Press, 1965. Uhlig, Mark A. "Latin America: The Frustrations of Success." Foreign Affairs 1990/91: 103-119.