CROSSING SUBSTANCES FOR COMMON INTEREST

An Examination of the Movement Against Targeted Alcohol and Tobacco Marketing
And Its Implications for Public Health Coalitions

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Introduction and Background

Targeted marketing started with a simple, but big idea: identify a market and target a product to that market based on its predisposition to use it. However, when that product increases risk of death and disease, targeting communities to consume it is tantamount to targeting communities for risk. Herein lies the controversy surrounding alcohol and tobacco marketing. Alcohol and tobacco companies say targeting is simply good and legitimate business. Community activists believe that what these companies call targeted marketing is really predatory marketing and they are organizing to end the practice. Examples of their efforts can be found nationwide:

- In Philadelphia, a minister whitewashes a billboard advertising cigarettes while hundreds look on cheering.

- In Chicago's south side, neighborhood activists organize more than 100 merchants to agree to not sell PowerMaster malt liquor in their community.

- In South Central Los Angeles, more than 35,000 people sign petitions protesting the overconcentration of alcohol outlets in their area.

- Uptown, PowerMaster, X and Dakota are but a few of the tobacco and alcohol products that were forced off the shelves or changed by this burgeoning movement.

This movement has an historical context that has evolved from movements for neighborhood safety, corporate accountability and consumer protection. At its heart is a redefinition of the meaning of advertising. For these activists, advertising is the most visual and visceral symbol of product availability. As availability is itself a reflection of social context (i.e., community power, cost, product characteristics), then advertising is not just promotion but a tool which orders in the marketplace the distribution and visible manifestation of consumerism. It is this aspect of advertising -- as organizing tool and signifier of what is available and to whom, and who determines consumer choices -- that has fueled the current controversy around targeted marketing by alcohol and tobacco companies.

Origins and Effects of Targeted Marketing

Targeting to Women

Modern targeting in present day marketing practices began in the mid-19th century with the advent of mail order advertising in catalogues "for the lady of the house." For alcohol and tobacco companies, as with most mainstream industries, there was only one market worth talking to then: white men.

The tobacco industry was among the first businesses to note that more than 50 percent of America was left untapped and in 1927, Marlboro led the way with a simple ad featuring a woman's hand holding a cigarette. (Wagner, 1971)
Two years later, Lucky initiated one of the most successful advertising campaigns in history with the slogan, "Reach for a Lucky instead of a sweet." This campaign, developed to exploit women's

weight concerns, increased Lucky sales threefold in just twelve months (Stauber and Rampton, 1995). Another campaign developed by public relations pioneer Edward Bernays had top fashion models marching in New York's Easter parade. Each model marched with a lit cigarette and banner proclaiming cigarettes a "torch of liberty." The campaign, the first to utilize themes of liberation, came out of a consultation with famed Freudian psychoanalyst A.A. Brill who told Bernays, "Cigarettes, which are equated with men, become torches of freedom." (Stauber and Rampton, 1995).

Marketing targeted to women by alcohol companies is a more recent phenomenon. Alcohol ads play on the same fears as the pioneering tobacco ads targeted to women: weight control and body image. Targeted products are promoted as "low calorie," or "light" and are often highly sweetened to appeal to young women. Wine coolers featured female endorsers for their products early on. Ad campaigns for California Cooler featured female consumers (versus women as models or props for advertising) in the early 1980s (Radio and TV Reports, 1993). More recent alcohol advertising has also taken a cue from the tobacco industry's current approach, utilizing feminist themes of power and self determination. Virginia Slims signature campaign, "You've come a long way baby," features very thin women in positions of control and independence. Ads for Coors beer almost mirror this campaign as they feature tributes to women in sports and other non-traditional roles.

Tobacco and alcohol companies' sponsorship efforts complemented their aggressive marketing to women as they funded the National Organization for Women (NOW) and other women's political organizations (Robinson, Bloch, et.al., 1992). Donations to these organizations, particularly by tobacco companies, further cemented their desired image as supporters of women's rights. Indeed, the only "rights" not validated were those of non-smokers. However, even this position is changing as demonstrated by the tobacco industry's response to studies confirming health risks from Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) and its call for compromise, negotiation, and conciliation as an alternative to higher taxes and further regulation.

Despite the libertarian focus, it is the fact that these sponsored organizations have a social agenda and enjoy public support that makes them so attractive -- and provides these industries with ample opportunity to co-opt a "rights" agenda when needed. For example, NOW joined forces with the alcohol industry to lobby the New York State Legislature not to post warnings concerning fetal alcohol syndrome because it appeared "to place the health of the fetus above the health of the mother." (Sack, 1991)

The Effects

Although some women were smoking before targeted advertising, the increase in women smokers grew at a faster rate after targeted advertising began. In fact, dramatic growth in prevalence occurred during periods of significant increases in targeted advertising - primarily between 1939-42 , 1946-50 and 1967-75 (Pierce, Lee, et. al., 1994). Numerous studies have found a correlation between expenditures on advertising targeted to women and increased market share of women smokers (Albright, Altman, et. al., 1988; Ernster, 1985; Warner and Goldenhar, 1992; Jones, 1987). According to one study, increases in targeted marketing are also correlated with increases in the number of new, young female smokers (Pierce, Lee, et.al., 1994).

Increased consumption of tobacco has led inevitably to higher levels of tobacco-related morbidity and mortality among women. The Census Bureau reported that during the 1980's, the number of men grew faster than the number of women in the United States, a phenomenon that has

not occurred since the first decade of the 20th Century. Bureau experts found that a significant factor was that cancer deaths had increased for women, while dropping for men. (Centers for Disease Control, 1989) Women began smoking extensively during World War II, and 20 years later their lung cancer deaths rate began to rise. Currently, lung cancer surpasses breast cancer as the chief cause of cancer death among women (National Cancer Institute, 1987)

The effects of increased smoking is not limited to older women dying of lung cancer. It is estimated that 4,000 infants die each year due to their mothers' (many of whom are young) smoking. (National Cancer Institute, 1987).

Youth Targeting

It was not until the post-war economic boom that youth were recognized as a viable market. For the first time in modern history, large numbers of youth did not have to work or marry early and had disposable income. This unique demographic group ushered in a new marketing frontier. Tobacco companies sponsored key television and radio programs (news, variety hours and rock and roll programs) (Wagner, 1971). Alcohol (primarily beer) companies expanded their sponsorship of professional sports to youth athletic events like college and high school team sports. Both alcohol and tobacco companies bought ads on arena signage or even donated signage with promotional messages already printed on them. Alcohol companies, wholesalers and retailers worked together to offer discounted drinks, sponsored drinking events on or near college campuses, and sponsored college Spring Break events where drinking to intoxication is the norm (Mosher, Ryan, 1991).

In the 1940's Philip Morris sent its diminutive "call for Philip Morris" persona to college campuses, many of which were black schools. It is perhaps not surprising that African American males surpassed white male smoking rates in the 1950's. (Robinson, Sutton, et.al., 1992)

Music has always been a powerful hook in advertising targeted to youth. Early sponsorship of popular radio programs like Hit Parade as well as the financing of "new" music concerts (i.e., be-bop and rock and roll) gave alcohol and tobacco companies a powerful wedge into the huge baby boomer market. Today, these industries continue the tradition through sponsorship of rap and modern rock concerts as well as the utilization of these new music forms in advertising. Newport stages cigarette giveaways in inner city communities from their trademark green vans which feature rap videos played on wide screen monitors. St. Ides malt liquor and other brewers employ the hottest rap artists to hawk their product on cable music video stations. Absolut vodka conducted a promotion in music magazines offering a free CD of modern rock music, and Camel cigarettes teamed up with Ticketmaster for a promotion featuring the brand's mascot, Joe Camel.

Today young people are a multi-billion dollar industry. Eighty seven percent of smokers began before they were 21 years old (Surgeon General, 1989). Nearly 20% of high school seniors smoke (Johnston, O'Malley, Bachman, 1995) and approximately three times as many high school dropouts (Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco, 1991). Alcohol is the drug of choice of youth in this country. Nationwide, 28.2% of high school seniors and 14.5% of eighth graders report heavy drinking (five or more drinks per occasion) as recently as two weeks before being surveyed. Thirty five percent of 19-20 year old college students also report heavy drinking within two weeks of being polled (Johnston, O'Malley, Bachman, 1995). These problems have translated into profits for the alcohol industry: 35% of all wine coolers and 1.1 billion beers sold are consumed by junior and senior high school kids. (Inspector General, 1991).

Despite major educational campaigns to encourage "drug-free" youth, young people continue to illegally drink and smoke to devastating effects. Tobacco is a risk factor in numerous

respiratory diseases among youth, especially asthma. Some studies have also linked tobacco use with other risky activities including juvenile delinquency and illicit drug use (Surgeon General, 1994). Alcohol-related injuries are the single leading cause of death among youth and young adults. Nearly one third of all deaths among males age 15 to 24 are alcohol-related (Johnston, O'Malley, Bachman, 1995).

Advertising by alcohol and tobacco companies are the leading source of information on these products. Education on the health effects of these products is little match for these industries' multi-billion dollar advertising and promotions efforts. A recent survey of three to six year old children found that the Joe Camel logo was more recognizable by children than Mickey Mouse (Fischer, Schwartz, et.al, 1991). An Inspector General report on alcohol advertising found that as long as alcohol companies engage in "lifestyle" advertising that seeks to invest important symbolic meaning in their products, it will be extremely difficult to separate the "cool" from the Colt 45 and other products in the minds of our young. (Inspector General, 1991).

Targeted Marketing to African Americans

African American targeting by alcohol and tobacco companies represented one of the earliest attempts by these industries to utilize race and identity as a marketing theme. The basic techniques perfected in early efforts to reach African Americans in the 1960's and 1970's are now being replicated to target Latinos, Asians and Native Americans today. Of course, efforts to sell alcohol and tobacco to African Americans pre-date explicit targeting campaigns. Ads for alcohol and tobacco products appeared in Ebony magazine and other traditional African American publications like the New York-based Amsterdam News since the 1940s (Pollay, Lee, et.al., 1992). In fact, the tobacco industry was the first to use prosperous African Americans in their advertising, contracting well known artists like Duke Ellington as early as the 1930s.

With the freedom movement of the 1960s, targeted advertising (particularly advertising that featured African Americans in responsible, prominent roles) increased dramatically. For example, cigarette ads in Ebony increased 300% from 1950-1965. Life magazine had only a 100% increase over the same period. (Pollay, et.al., 1992) Ads for Kool, Seagram and other products targeting middle class Blacks featured well dressed African American professionals in luxurious settings.

The ads, like in other targeting efforts, sought to associate their products with the deep sentiment of the times. Ads for mentholated cigarettes and malt liquor appearing in Jet, Ebony and on Black radio from 1965-1975 increasingly featured dark skinned women and men wearing natural hair, and utilized slang terms like "groovy," "baby" and "soul." (Survey, 1994). These companies further solidified the relationship by hiring African American ad experts to develop these advertising themes. Further, when tobacco ads were taken off the air in the 1970's, African American publishers pursued the industry and indicated they wanted these dollars to be allocated to their publications. (Robinson, Sutton, et.al., 1992).

Alcohol and tobacco companies have a long history of making financial contributions to key African American organizations. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Urban League were among the many who receive support from these industries. Additionally, both tobacco and alcohol companies had practiced relatively aggressive hiring practices as early as the 1940s that gave the growing number of college educated Blacks an opportunity to ply their business training when other companies would not. This history seemed to prepare alcohol and tobacco companies to take advantage of the marketing opportunities afforded by the turbulent 1960s like other large industries could not (Robinson, Sutton, et.al, 1992).

And take advantage they did.

These industries parlayed their impressive inroads into African American communities into a virtual monopoly on sponsorship of important cultural institutions and events. Dr. Peter Bell, former executive director of the Institute on Black Chemical Abuse once noted, "I am not aware of any major Black cultural event that does not have a liquor or tobacco company as a primary sponsor." (Robinson, Sutton, et.al.,1992) With everything from outdoor festivals, community theater to the Congressional Black Caucus, these companies provide major funding and support for high profile efforts throughout the African American community. In the case of Coors Brewing Company, major African American organizations including the NAACP and the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church signed a covenant with the company that tied increased product consumption rates among blacks to increases in sponsorship and investments in African American business (Coors, 1990). The covenant, forged in 1985 and renewed in 1990 reads in part: "Whereas, understanding the share of COORS business within the Black marketplace is very important if COORS is to return a fair share of its income to the Black community, COORS agrees to endeavor to obtain a 10% level of its annual volume and potential from the Black community. Future figures will reflect market position, goodwill and corporate social responsibility." (Coors, 1990)

Sponsorship has bought political support from some of the most respected institutions in the African American community. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) is a case in point: The New York chapter of the NAACP supported the tobacco industries' campaign against clean indoor air regulations. Their rationale: concern that the rights of workers who smoke, the majority or whom were African American, would be in jeopardy. Observers believe that opposition to clean indoor air would have never been on the agenda of the nation's oldest civil rights organization without substantial support from the tobacco industry. (Robinson, Sutton, et.al., 1992)

The involvement has its cost: Alcohol and tobacco related problems are the leading causes of morbidity and mortality in African American communities. Rates of acute and chronic alcohol-related diseases among blacks, which were formerly lower than or similar to those among whites, have increased dramatically since World War II. Currently, blacks are at extremely high risk for acute and chronic alcohol-related diseases such as alcoholic fatty liver, hepatitis, cirrhosis of the liver, and esophageal cancer (Herd, 1989). Based on death certificate information compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Center for Health Statistics, African-Americans are nearly twice as likely to die from chronic liver disease and cirrhosis than whites (CDC, 1990).

Cancers of the oral cavity and throat are 30 to 50 percent higher in blacks than whites and seem to recur at an exceptionally high rate. The primary causes of these cancers are tobacco use, alcohol consumption, and probably inadequate nutrition. African American males have a 58% higher incidence of lung cancer and African American females have higher rates of fetal death and low birthweight babies (Kellie 1989). African Americans also have a higher rate of coronary heart disease and cancer than any other population group in the U.S. (Baquet 1986, Cooper 1985, NCI, 1988) Coronary heart disease and cancer are attributable to smoking at a rate of 21.5 and 86.1% respectively (Shopland 1991).

Interestingly enough, African Americans tend to abstain from alcohol at higher rates than whites and use of both alcohol and tobacco by African American youth are much lower than their white cohorts. However, due to a variety of intervening factors (socio-economic status,

discriminatory zoning laws and access to and quality of health care), African Americans are more likely to suffer from problems related to alcohol and tobacco use than whites. This higher and more visceral level of problems suffered in African American communities, combined with its large numbers of abstainers and the historical context wherein these communities have traditionally fought for its survival, created the conditions for African Americans to pioneer a movement focused on preventing alcohol and tobacco related problems.

Of course, African Americans were not the only people working to address alcohol and tobacco industry practices. The current policy-focused prevention movement and its approach to media has its roots in the movements for civil rights, consumer protection, and community development. It is important to examine these efforts because they each continue to shape the relationships and tensions of alcohol and tobacco policy efforts and related-media advocacy campaigns.

Civil rights movement leaves communities with history of rebellion and reprisal

Perhaps the first grassroots movement to take place during the era of television was the African American civil rights movement. This effort was the first grassroots initiative to effectively use television news as a medium for promoting policy. Each night, America watched as African Americans faced white supremacist violence in response to their demands for equal opportunity and justice. The cameras were there bearing witness thanks to civil rights strategists who saw national media as a critical component of their efforts. Before network news cameras turned toward the southern battlefields, African Americans faced severe reprisals for their organizing activity. It was commonplace for an advocate to lose their job, their house and even their life for speaking out against racism (Branch, 1988)

One particularly effective form of reprisal was legal action by government entities or private business associations. These lawsuits sought and received gag orders on organization leadership and barred organizations from boycotts (Woodward, 1974; Meltsner, 1965; Frederickson, 1995) which for decades, changed how civil rights organizations conducted political actions (Woodward, 1974) One of the most famous of these cases was the 1956 case of NAACP vs. the State of Alabama (NAACP, 1959). In this case, the Attorney General of Alabama obtained a "temporary" order prohibiting the NAACP from doing "business of any description or kind" in Alabama. The state's reason: in the 38 years of doing business in Alabama, the NAACP had never registered under the state corporation law. This act had caused, according to the Attorney General "irreparable injury to the property and civil rights of the residents and citizens of the State."

Clearly, the real cause of injury was the effort for school integration backed up by economic boycotts targeting segregated stores, restaurants and other business establishments. These boycotts were considered highly effective, particularly in areas where African Americans were a significant portion of the population. The NAACP, Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church and others were forced to leverage their buying power in the struggle for political and electoral power in a recalcitrant South (Frederickson, 1995).

Increasing activism was met with increasing oppression - particularly from the judicial system (Meltsner, 1965). The NAACP had to choose how to best utilize its already stretched legal defense fund. It was far too costly to target businesses directly. Previous legal cases made it all too clear that any activity that interfered with a business' profitability would be met with swift retaliation. Although there would be cases to come along that effectively reinstated their right to boycott (Meltsner, 1965) the NAACP and others shifted its emphasis from matters of corporate to government accountability and ethics, particularly at the federal level. It would be decades before the NAACP and other African American organizations rejoined the corporate accountability

movement in full swing. Even today the impact of these past reprisals is still being felt. A case in point, major civil rights groups like People United to Save Humanity (PUSH) and the Urban League still call for "selective buying" campaigns, not boycotts. This emphasis on the public sector continues to guide African American activists working on alcohol and tobacco policy.

As history attests, even with the severe reprisals and violence, the civil rights movement and its many victories on the policy level, set the stage for other movements. These efforts found their voice and courage in a new era of commitment to justice with policy (including increased regulation) as a significant part of the solution. One of the most successful efforts to enjoy this new climate of regulation was the consumer protection movement of the 1960's and 70's.

Consumer protection movement lays foundation for modern policy movement

Alcohol and tobacco policy advocacy on the national level owes most of its form, frame and leadership to the modern consumer protection movement of the 1960's. In contrast to the routine violence and retribution mounted in response to civil rights advocacy of the 1950's and 60's, and the revolutionary movement of the late 1960's and 70's, the consumer protection movement was relatively non-confrontational. The result: over a thousand pieces of consumer protection legislation passed from 1960-80 (Westlaw search). In fact, Democratic leaders of the Senate and House Commerce Committees concerned that regulation had gone into overkill, wrote in a letter to the president, "Regulation is as American as 'hot dogs, baseball, apple pie and Chevrolet.'" (Pertschuk, 1980)

Most of the consumer protection battles took place in the halls of Congress or in state legislative houses between well-heeled elected officials, affected industry lobbyists and wunderkind reformers of the likes of Ralph Nader, Elizabeth Drew and Michael Pertschuk. With few exceptions, grassroots organizing was confined mostly to calls to interested parties and organizational members for letters and phone calls in support of pending legislation, and membership dues. The group was media savvy, effectively making use of personal relationships with reporters that grew out of college and professional networks forged on Capitol Hill. One important exception worth noting was the Nestle boycott.

Nestle was different because of the locus of the problem. It was not under the hoods of suburban cars or in basements like most targets of consumer protection initiatives. It was affecting babies in developing countries where Congress had little impact. Indeed, studies had found a correlation between the decline in breast feeding and increased malnutrition in children due to increased bottle feeding, infection from improper or unclean feeding practices and the absence of the immunological protection that breast feeding provides. Dr. Derrick Jelliffe, director of the Caribbean Food and Nutrition Institute in Jamaica (and a leader in this area) had estimated that 10 million cases of infectious disease and infant malnutrition were directly attributable to improper bottle feeding every year (Baudot, 1989).

Health professionals joined forces with religious and consumer advocacy groups to promote policies that would address this problem. In 1974, the Consumer's Union published a book that drew strong connections between the problem of infant malnutrition and the promotional practices of infant formula producers, most notably Nestle. After three years of applying pressure on Nestle to change its marketing practices, Infant Formula Coalition Action (INFACT) organized an international boycott of Nestle products. A star studded cast of celebrities joined the effort including Dr. Benjamin Spock and Cesar Chavez. CBS aired a 30 minute documentary (hosted by Bill Moyers) investigating infant formula related health problems in the Dominican Republic. This

program, which focused on industry marketing practices, is estimated to have been watched by 9 million viewers

With a strong international coalition and public opinion now firmly on their side, advocates were in a prime position to push their policy goal: to establish an international code that strictly regulated the marketing of infant formula. The World Health Organization (WHO) adopted the International Code of Marketing Breast Milk Substitutes in 1981 but Nestle remained opposed to it in spite of the fact that it passed 118 to 1 (the U.S. cast the sole negative vote).

It was not until January 1984 that Nestle finally agreed to fully comply with the WHO code. In addition to this victory, advocates won additional concessions from Nestle including an agreement to promote breast feeding explicitly in the company's educational literature as the superior method of feeding and strengthen its label warning against misuse of formula (Baudot, 1989). This effort, due mostly to its widespread support in diverse communities, was able to use a boycott effectively to change corporate policy. Further, these advocates' personal relationships with policymakers and others in power protected them from the severity of reprisal that had been endured by mostly people of color in the civil rights movement. As a result, these advocates were more willing and able to take on corporations. This difference in experience and historical context set the stage for the bifurcation of the corporate accountability movement: leaving civil rights groups generally working at the federal level to get more protection passed in the form of government policy and social programs, and consumer protection advocates working to change how corporations were regulated.

Although the Nestle boycott had enjoyed international community support (which was key to its success) the coalition had no organic relationship to these communities (i.e., an institutionalized, natural connection through shared community, class, culture, geography, or common problems). This lack of an organic connection to its constituencies resulted in the coalition's focus on high profile, top-down organizing designed to increase their membership. This organizing formula became the mainstay of most public health and consumer protection groups: 1) target the industry practice with tactics designed to appeal to media and membership; 2) mount a media advocacy campaign; and 3) reach out -- primarily to similar organizations and their supporters -- for protest letters, funds, or attendance at actions. It was not until recently, that this approach to organizing began to run out of steam. Due to changes in Congress and public sentiment, consumer protection groups could no longer rely on personal relationships and press conferences to advance their agenda. Now, national consumer groups were forced to build a base of support by working more closely with local advocates -- many of whom had backed into alcohol and tobacco issues while laboring in the political vineyards for community development.

Local control movement takes shape

While consumer protection advocates enjoyed unprecedented victories on Capitol Hill, the 1960's found urban community activists escalating their effort from civil rights to civil war. Neighborhood by neighborhood, block by block, America's cities seemed to be in flames with neighborhood groups fighting hard for the most basic of services like quality schools, decent housing and public safety, as well as basic rights like representation and self-determination. The federal government begrudgingly heard these protests, providing funding for new programs designed to "renew" the nation's cities, including neighborhood redevelopment and urban renewal.

Many of these programs had "maximum feasible participation" clauses that required that the programs be administered with input from community residents. Head Start, for example, required that neighborhood parents have seats on policy committees up until 1968. Urban renewal, related poverty programs and other redevelopment projects required community representation on

governing boards and community notice of meetings of their governing boards. (Kahn, 1969) State alcohol beverage control agencies were also brought under this regulatory trend as departments were required to post notices of proposed alcohol outlet locations and other changes in alcohol outlet licensing in affected neighborhoods.

Neighborhood notification of new alcohol outlets helped to galvanize local action to control these outlets. Many neighborhood residents consider alcohol outlets magnets for crime and instability in inner city communities. Even during the "urban unrest" of the 1960's, residents in Detroit, Los Angeles, New York and Chicago interviewed in a 1968 Ebony article named the high number of liquor stores as an issue of concern (Ebony, 1968).

Over the past 30 years, community groups have organized around local alcohol availability as a way to reduce risk in their communities. They observed that urban communities of color were targeted with certain alcohol products that were not made available or even advertised in white neighborhoods. Fortified wines and beers (malt liquors) were featured in culturally-specific advertising and often promoted the very behaviors (i.e., public drinking, violence, over consumption, etc.) that community groups were seeking to eliminate. In the late 1980s, tobacco became more of an issue as ads targeted the most potent and deadly (high tar, high nicotine, mentholated) cigarettes to these communities (Robinson, Sutton, et.al., 1992).

Residents also felt that the advertising was offensive. Olde English 800 billboards promoted the product's strength, used slang for cocaine ("eight ball") and featured scantily clad women. Seagrams had a billboard that featured an African American couple in an intimate pose: a man with his face in a woman's open blouse. This angered residents who felt these companies were operating from a cynical view of their communities as places where "anything goes."

Discriminatory patterns in local zoning law left residents with few options for regulatory relief. Inner city communities, regardless of how residential they were, were zoned for business use which meant large numbers of billboards and excessive ad signage on retail outlets were permitted in neighborhoods. Some residents endured billboards on their homes or in their yards that were permitted by landlords and sanctioned by local planning authorities. This local experience of alcohol and tobacco marketing as blight literally put the issue of targeted marketing in the face of community-based advocates.

The contrast in experiences between advocates working in urban communities and national public health advocacy groups engendered contrasting beliefs and tactics in approaching corporate accountability issues. First, reprisals made community leadership hesitant to target corporations. History had taught community based advocates to focus on government entities because they were more accessible, accountable and community folk felt they had more power over these institutions. Attempts to shame corporations without high probability of success ran counter to their best instincts. Losing could threaten these advocates' credibility with their constituents which, in turn, could affect their local organizing efforts.

National public health groups focused on a more short-term, media-driven agenda that benefited greatly from public shaming of corporations. Issues of local economic development and institution building were not a priority for these groups. Working together would be a challenge but these two groups needed each other. Community-based advocates needed the national media attention and resources that national groups offered and national groups needed community support to advance its policy agenda. The resulting coalition would change how each would approach policy change. Perhaps the most important result of this alliance would be a shift toward cross-substance (alcohol and tobacco policy) coalition building.

Crossing Substances for Common Interest

Although common ground between alcohol and tobacco policy may seem obvious; however, there has been much debate about the utility of cross-substance coalition building. It is no accident that those cross-substance coalitions that do exist are mainly community-based groups focused on marketing practices and youth access. Issues like excise taxes, restrictions on adult use, and even health effects have been sources of tension between alcohol and tobacco policy advocates. Many alcohol policy advocates believe that tobacco is more deadly over the long term and must be taxed and restricted appropriately but privately question whether they should invest their energy in a substance whose morbidity and mortality rates are due primarily to degenerative disease (fires being the exception). On the other hand, many tobacco control advocates see alcohol-related problems as a public health issue but believe these problems are dwarfed by tobacco-related deaths (the ratio is about 4:1). They have ambivalence about a substance that has acceptable, non-addictive uses. However, advocates on either side found common ground in the fight against the most visible symbol of these industries' targeting efforts: billboards.

Billboard Policy Spurs Local Activism

Detroit's Coalition Against Billboard Advertising of Alcohol and Tobacco (CABAAT) was founded by then Wayne County Commissioner Alberta Tinsley-Williams. Tinsley-Williams was outraged by neighborhood billboards advertising Tops rolling paper and Wild Irish Rose (a fortified wine). Using her elected office and community standing, she worked to raise public awareness of what she called "killboards."

A 1989 coalition survey found that 55 of the 97 billboards on Detroit's Mack Avenue advertised alcohol and tobacco. CABAAT later petitioned their city council to survey the over 4,000 billboards in Detroit. The survey found that Detroit, like most inner city communities, had an over-concentration of alcohol and tobacco billboards compared to its more affluent suburbs. (CSAP, 1994) As a County Commissioner, Tinsley-Williams was able to use her staff and other resources to organize a successful march and rally protesting the billboards. Utilizing themes of injustice and exploitation, as well as Tinsley-Williams' popularity, the coalition was able to gain access to media in the form of opinion pieces and news articles.

CABAAT's efforts were widely publicized, spurring community groups to take up similar efforts in Chicago, Milwaukee, Los Angeles and elsewhere (CSAP, 1994). It was this burgeoning network of advocates that later came together to fight the launch of Uptown cigarettes. In addition, national public health organizations contacted the group offering support and inviting CABAAT to help promote their national policy agendas to regulate alcohol and tobacco advertising. Tinsley-Williams and other CABAAT members tour the country speaking on cross-substance coalition building. CABAAT is now a nationally recognized source for media on issues of public health and targeted marketing to African Americans and youth.

Uptown shifts leadership on targeting issues

Inspired by the work of CABAAT, African American activists were mounting local campaigns to reduce alcohol and tobacco billboards in their community. Dr. Calvin Butts of New York, Mandrake of Chicago and Johnnie Morris-Tatum of Milwaukee were among the leaders of these initiatives. Prior to Uptown, these advocates were a loose network who found out about each

other through the media and called upon each other every once in a while for support and advice. RJR Nabisco's plan to launch a new cigarette brand during Black History changed all that.

Uptown was a menthol cigarette targeted to African Americans to be test marketed in Philadelphia, home of the famous Uptown Theater. Like New York's famous Apollo Theater, Uptown was an important institution in African American history. Uptown's slogan, "The Place. The Taste," made this connection explicit. RJR was proud of its marketing effort and announced in mid-December its intentions to launch Uptown on February 5, 1990. However, RJR had not anticipated the response it received from the Philadelphia African American community and a network of African American advocates nationwide.

In Philadelphia, a group comprised mostly of professionals working in public agencies and community organizations formed the Coalition Against Uptown Cigarettes. Its goal: to thwart RJR's test marketing before it started. Significantly, Rev. Jesse Brown a member of the Committee to Prevent Cancer Among Blacks (and also pastor of a small church in North Central Philadelphia), Dr. Robert G. Robinson of the Fox Chase Cancer Center, Charyn Sutton, a prominent media consultant, and Dr. Carl Mansfield, President of the local American Cancer Society held leadership positions in the group. All are African American thus, making Uptown the first tobacco control initiative led by African Americans.

The coalition was a diverse gathering of health, religious and community organizations working in the Philadelphia community. Significantly, the group also received support and technical assistance from national tobacco control policy groups. Leaders held their coalition together by agreeing to a number of basic principles. First, a commitment to organize broadly in the African American community - including smokers because if they needed to mount a boycott of the company, it would take smokers to do so. Second, the focus was to be placed on RJR and not other African Americans or African American organizations that might have a history of accepting tobacco industry money and "be on the wrong side of the issue." Third, their effort was a local effort to stop RJR from test marketing the product in Philadelphia. Indeed, one of the first and most important decisions made by core organizers from the African American community was to reject the suggestion by the American Cancer Society (prior to the Coalition's first meeting) not to focus on the Uptown brand but to choose instead the more traditional focus on the health-related consequences of the cigarettes. Uptown would be the focus and, by definition, the relationship of this new cigarette brand to the African American community. Their primary goal was to mobilize the Philadelphia African American community around this issue.

This understood, the coalition saw the media primarily as a tool to mobilize their community. Local media was more important than national media and local media outlets that "spoke to" African Americans were more important still. Even though these principles were clear, implementation was not easy.

Immediately after the first coalition meeting, the American Cancer Society, an Uptown Coalition member, received a call from the New York Times requesting a list of the organizations that joined the coalition. For some, it seemed that the coalition should comply with the New York Times request right away. After all, this was the New York Times, the newspaper of record for this country. A story there was viewed by some as a media opportunity that should not be passed up. For others, it seemed premature to publish the list. Most African American organizations needed time to go through their organization's endorsement process in order to lend their formal support to the effort. At that time, the "formal" coalition consisted primarily of groups in the traditional tobacco control movement such as the American Cancer Society, American Heart Association, and the American Lung Association and was not yet representative of the broader African American

community. There was concern that the Times story would depict coalition membership as "the same old players" without support among broader segments of the African America community.

The group decided to wait to release the list at an upcoming press conference when more organizations could be announced. "And sure enough," said Charyn Sutton, "we got other African American organizations and the Times didn't go away. They understood." (Charyn Sutton, phone interview, 1/23/93)

The group faced a similar decision when ABC's Good Morning America requested that a Coalition representative come on the show and debate a marketing expert on the Uptown issue. The marketing expert was African American. It was against the Coalition's principles to engage in any activity that would pit them against other African Americans or African American institutions. There would be no Coalition representative on the show. Although it was a clear call for the Coalition, it was less so for tobacco control activists at the national level working with and providing technical assistance to the Coalition. They thought the Good Morning America appearance would have been a good opportunity to promote the Uptown issue to a wider audience.

The debate reflected differences in perspective and priorities. The Coalition was focused on local organizing and long term relationships within the African American community in order to build a broad base of support. The national groups that worked with the Coalition saw Uptown as another opportunity to shame the tobacco industry. The more press -- and the bigger the press -- the better. The debate about media continued as the Coalition also turned down other national shows including The McNeil-Lehrer News Hour because their goal was organizing local support. For Coalition leadership, media had to support that goal or it wasn't valuable.

"We would go to a local newspaper before we would go national. Even though there was more glamour in the national media, it was a diversion. Our task was the local piece. Our audience is in Philadelphia. The test market was in Philadelphia and if we could win it, we would win it in Philadelphia." (Charyn Sutton, phone interview, 1/23/93)

This contact and the resulting debate between the local coalition and mainstream public health groups was the beginning of a new era of collaboration. Prior to Uptown, much of the national dialogue around tobacco policy took place in the same forum as the classic consumer protection movement: between professional public health advocates and federal and state legislators. In addition, Uptown Coalition leadership also sought and received the support of other African American advocates nationwide including Secretary of Health and Human Services, Dr. Louis Sullivan. Participation by these advocates and federal health leaders enriched the debate and helped the Coalition stick to their grassroots strategy.

The campaign against Uptown cigarettes helped to set the stage for future advocacy around targeted marketing in three ways. First, it provided a model of how a community-based coalition led by African Americans could mobilize communities nationwide around the targeting issue. Previously, mainstream public health groups had taken the lead in organizing demonstrations and press conferences. Members of the Uptown coalition decided, from the beginning, that the campaign would be based in the African American community. Previous anti-targeting efforts by national groups (like a 1989 malt liquor advertising initiative by the Center for Science in the Public Interest) faced industry charges that these groups were paternalistic outsiders (read whites) who were interfering with consumers' right to choose. The industry could not make these charges in the Uptown case. The effectiveness of the Coalition's strategy was not lost on alcohol and tobacco policy advocates. Traditional public health organizations, discovered the importance of organic community leadership and sought out Uptown coalition leadership in order to bring

diversity to their efforts. This connection provided an important link between the successful Uptown campaign and the broader national alcohol and tobacco policy movements.

Second, the Uptown campaign provided a concrete link between the struggle against unethical targeted marketing and the fight for social justice. The mainstream public health agencies emphasized the moral and health issues of targeted marketing. By reframing the targeting issue as 1) an unethical appropriation of African American images to undermine community health; and 2) the denial of residents' rights to determine what products are allowed in their community, the campaign drew a relationship between questionable advertising practices and community under-development and related-problems. These tactics enabled the coalition to effectively link targeted marketing, public health and social justice in a way that put tobacco control on the economic and political agenda as well as the public health agenda.

Third, with the advent of Uptown, the national media began to address targeted marketing as an issue of cultural appropriation and exploitation. This provided a foundation of media awareness and interest in the targeting issue which came to be especially important in the campaign to stop the launching of PowerMaster malt liquor. Perhaps Uptown's greatest contribution was that it lay the foundation for a national coalition to carry the issue of targeted marketing into the media and public policy forums. A little over a year after the successful Uptown campaign, Uptown coalition leadership joined with other African American advocates to form the National Association of African Americans for Positive Imagery (NAAAPI) (Themba, 1994).

In March, 1991, African American tobacco and alcohol control advocates held the first NAAAPI meeting in Greensboro, North Carolina. Rev. Jesse Brown recalled:

"We pointed out the connection between disease, destruction and alcohol in the African American community. We pointed out the high percentage of people who are involved in violent acts who were intoxicated at the time. Both alcohol and tobacco companies treated the African American community the same way for the most part, by using our images, our stars, our heroes to perpetuate their deadly product. The issue of image and how we are perceived, how others defame our image or character, is something that many community people are concerned about. We talked about the need to perpetuate and preserve our own image." (Brown, 1993).

NAAAPI consisted of Uptown Coalition members in Philadelphia and supporters of their efforts nationwide. Many of the participants were active in the burgeoning anti-tobacco and alcohol billboard movement and were protesting the placement of billboards advertising alcohol and tobacco in their communities through rallies, pickets and by even painting over the ads.

PowerMaster

Just two months after the NAAAPI summit, G. Heileman Brewing Co. decided to produce a more potent version of its Colt 45 malt liquor, called PowerMaster, and market it directly to the African American community. Although many in the public health field had real problems with Heileman's blatant targeting plan, advocates debated whether to get involved in the PowerMaster issue. Some felt that the malt liquor category was hopelessly out of control and that PowerMaster was just another brand that would be permitted to operate outside of the law. NAAAPI and others argued that, based on the Uptown case, they had a greater chance of defeating the product before it was distributed. NAAAPI and other public health organizations agreed to go forward on the PowerMaster issue.

Since 1935, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) has had the power to regulate alcohol advertising under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act. Although this act

prohibits beer advertising that promotes product strength, malt liquor advertisers had flouted this law in advertising targeted to inner city (and mostly African American and Latino) communities. Slogans such as Pabst Olde English 800 "It's the Power" and Schlitz Red Bull's "It's the Real Power" were commonplace violations of the "potency rule." Many of these campaigns had gone on for more than a decade.

The conditions seemed right for a malt liquor campaign. A highly enthusiastic press called advocates daily, eager not to miss another "Uptown story." Of course, media primarily contacted advocates they knew in the mainstream public health organizations, with the notable exception of Dr. Calvin Butts, a well respected pastor of Harlem's historic Abyssinian Baptist Church and a leader of the billboard whitewashing movement. These advocates, including Dr. Butts, framed alcohol industry targeting of racial and ethnic communities as a moral issue.

The industry countered that targeting was standard business practice and went further by attempting to frame advocates as paternalistic. This tactic worked when most of the advocates quoted in the press were white, while the consumers in question were predominantly African American. To avoid these charges, mainstream advocates, most notably George Hacker of the Advocacy Institute and Pat Taylor of the Center for Science in the Public Interest, took a cue from the Uptown campaign and decided to hand off most media calls on malt liquor to African American advocates -- most of whom were veterans of Uptown.

This shift in leadership also led to a shift in frame. The bulk of African Americans organizing against predatory marketing chose to focus more on equal protection issues and less on the morality of targeting "vulnerable" populations. For advocates, the target was the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms who, they believed, did not extend equal enforcement of code violations to communities of color. Shifting the focus from the company to the government also reflected advocates' deep roots in civil rights tactics which traditionally favored public targets. It also enabled advocates to undermine industry charges that public health advocates were acting out of paternalism toward racial and ethnic communities.

Work began at the grassroots level in five major cities (New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit and Los Angeles) by encouraging merchants not to stock PowerMaster in their stores. The second step was working an interested media. More than 30 newspaper articles and several television and radio stories ran in the two weeks after PowerMaster was announced in the Wall Street Journal (June 17, 1991) including a feature on ABC's Nightline.

In the press, public health advocates worked to counter the alcohol industry's line that marketing and promotion had little impact on alcohol problems and that protesting PowerMaster was a violation of Heileman's right to free enterprise and individual drinkers' right to choose. NAAAPI and others responded that Heileman's marketing strategy not only immorally preyed on a community at risk, but it was also in violation of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act's prohibition of beer advertising that makes potency claims. PowerMaster had been approved by ATF which advocates saw as part of the bureau's pattern of unequal protection they were fighting to change.

On July 1, 1991, ATF announced that it was revoking label approval for PowerMaster based on the "potency rule." Said NAAAPI Chairman Rev. Jesse W. Brown, "Grassroots activity nationwide made the difference in this effort. Heileman and ATF expected PowerMaster to roll out to business as usual. By pressuring them with old fashioned, high visibility tactics, we were able to put an end to that."

The PowerMaster campaign brought visibility to the malt liquor issue and put it on the public agenda, capturing the attention of top government officials. A July 1, 1991, USA Today opinion piece by U.S. Surgeon General Antonia Novello made the following appeal:

"I urge Americans to get involved and to get in charge. Tell the purveyors of alcohol and their hired-gun persuaders that we have had enough disease, disability and death. Tell them that we simply will not tolerate marketing that distorts and deceives the effects of products, or campaigns that are designed to keep our minorities enslaved by taking away their good health, freedom, and dignity.

Like Uptown, PowerMaster presented the opportunity to defeat a product before it was unleashed on the community. G. Heileman's decision to withdraw PowerMaster served as a catalyst for other target marketing campaigns because it showed that a powerful liquor company could be challenged and defeated. Well almost.

Six months later, Heileman tentatively rolled out another brand, Colt 45 Premium. Ironically, the product was introduced to two markets initially, Detroit and Philadelphia, where anti-PowerMaster activity had been high. Colt 45 Premium had the same potency as PowerMaster but did not have the illegal labeling. Despite initial noises in the media by some activists, the new product just did not offend as many people as PowerMaster did. So without a grassroots response and with no legal case to stand on, Colt 45 Premium quietly found its way to inner city neighborhoods nationwide.

However, the effort was not a total loss. During the campaign against PowerMaster, ATF began investigating a complaint filed by a CSPI-led coalition on malt liquor advertising practices. As a result, most malt liquor brands received warnings to either revise or withdraw current promotion campaigns and an internal label review board was formed within the bureau to more closely monitor brand applications. Most notably, Olde English 800 had to stop using its long-time slogan, "It's the Power" and St. Ides was even fined for code violations and forced to withdraw several ads. Perhaps most importantly, the PowerMaster campaign solidified NAAAPI as a national cross-substance coalition.

Grandparents on the March

Baltimore's Citywide Liquor Coalition for Better Laws and Regulations (CWLC) is a group of primarily older, African American neighborhood activists working to improve the quality of life in Baltimore's inner city. A coalition of more than 100 neighborhood associations, churches and civic groups, CWLC is organized and staffed by the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (CPHA), Baltimore's oldest citizen action organization. CWLC has been working to address alcohol and tobacco marketing and availability issues since the late 1980s. Earlier victories include getting a state law enacted in 1992 that restricted 200 of 600 taverns from selling alcohol for consumption off premises or to apply for licenses as package stores. The law also limited business hours to between 9 a.m. and midnight, and required the taverns to close on Sundays. (Seevak,1995)

In 1986, CWLC worked with another local group, the Coalition for Beautiful Neighborhoods, to secure the removal of more than 1200 illegal "junior" billboards that were attached to the walls of liquor stores or convenience stores selling alcohol. These signs usually measured at 5' by 11' and were reported to bring in estimated revenue of $1 million to $2.5 million. (Seevak, 1995)

In June 1992, CWLC decided to revisit the billboard issue and target Penn Advertising, a local billboard company that owned most of Baltimore's larger billboards. Coalition members were

concerned about the fact that most of the billboards advertised alcohol and tobacco and seemed to be located predominantly in poor communities of color.

The Coalition approached Councilwoman Sheila Dixon (D- Fourth District), a strong ally, to introduce the billboard legislation to the Baltimore City Council. The legislation hit a snag when City Solicitor Neal Janey ruled that, while the tobacco billboards could be handled locally, the state had pre-emptory powers on the alcohol issue. The Coalition split the bill in two. And in January 1993, CWLC went to Annapolis to get an author and pass legislation which would enable alcohol billboards to be handled as a local issue. Kevin Jordan, CWLC organizer described that process: "When we started the bill no one even took it seriously ...We introduced the bill in the state and people kind of patted us on the head and said 'Oh, that's nice.' And that was it. Our first person who was going to introduce it, didn't introduce it. We had to get someone else." (Seevak, 1994)

With help and training from the Citizens Planning and Housing Alliance, first term senator Ralph Hughes (D-Baltimore), and Amy Blank, chief lobbyist for Advocates for Children (an advocacy organization), CWLC organized a formidable lobbying assault to get their enabling legislation passed.

Led by CWLC chair, Bev Thomas and supported by Kevin Jordan, CWLC's young, paid organizer, community people lobbied delegates intensively. Thomas and other key advocates spent as much as "ten hours a day, five days a week" at the capital. When funding was available, they also hired buses to bring CWLC members in from Baltimore to attend hearings and to lobby.

Key to the lobbying effort was an effective phone tree run by Mary Lou Kline, a grandmother who cared for several grandchildren. Jordan and Thomas would develop scripts and Kline would activate the phone tree to place added pressure on delegates.

Thanks to this well organized outpouring of grassroots support, the bill was seen as a local, relatively non-controversial matter in the Senate. The coalition even capitalized on its well-funded opposition by calling the media's attention to the David and Goliath drama taking place around the bill. The Coalition took a tough situation and got great press that framed the alcohol, tobacco and billboard industries as "big guns" working to thwart the will of the people. Said Bev Thomas: "When the Sun did an article about Bruce Bereano (lobbyist for Penn Advertising and the Tobacco Institute), people said, 'Oh, that's the same guy. All that money and stuff.' People latched onto us. That's us against the lobbyists. They make the connections. Every day people became conscious of what the process is. Why we don't get certain things. Opening up to many folks that we don't have legislators down there just doing it for us. It's a whole process." (Seevak, 1995)

The bill passed with few amendments -- mainly allowing alcohol and tobacco signage in sports and racing arenas. By the time it got back to Baltimore, CWLC had garnered considerable grassroots support which made these grandparents formidable players in the policy arena. The group also recruited a pro bono lawyer from a local high-powered law firm to help craft the ordinances enabling them to survive industry court challenges all the way to the Supreme Court. Both billboard ordinances passed by large margins and CWLC continues to work on alcohol and tobacco policy as well as the implementation of the ordinances.

Communities take back Cinco De Mayo festivals

Another fertile area for cross-substance coalition building was the effort to stop alcohol and tobacco industry sponsorship of special events. Alcohol policy activists saw a clear relationship between public safety and sponsorship as festivals sponsored by alcohol companies often served alcohol in family settings and had a higher number of problems. Tobacco control advocates were concerned about cigarette giveaways and marketing practices that created "innocence by

association," because tobacco companies used their sponsorship to create goodwill - and silence - in targeted communities. (Robinson, Bloch, et.al, 1992) Of course, asking the often struggling non-profits who produced these events to give up much needed revenue was no easy task. It was going to take widespread community support, fiscal creativity and a compelling public health argument to persuade event organizers to just say no to alcohol and tobacco money.

One area where advocates have been successful in this regard has been the development of alcohol and tobacco-free Cinco de Mayo festivals. Cinco de Mayo is one of the most important traditional holidays celebrated by Mexican-Americans in the United States. It commemorates the victory of the Mexican army over the invading French forces in the city of Puebla on May 5, 1862. This victory for the Mexican people established May 5th as a symbol of the fight against foreign domination and the struggle for self-determination. Cinco de Mayo was long celebrated in the U.S. Southwest, beginning with the mutual aid societies and other cooperative associations at the turn of the century. In the early 1960's, when the Chicano movement gained momentum, Latinos began to celebrate Cinco de Mayo as a way to reassert identity long denied by the dominant culture (Yañez, 1991).

Alcohol and tobacco industries endeavored to turn this important historical celebration into one more marketing opportunity. In 1988, corporations spent close to $25 million on Cinco de Mayo promotions in Southern California alone. Some of the biggest spenders: Adolph Coors, Anheuser Busch and Stroh's Brewery (Center for Science in the Public Interest, 1991). Communities said, "Basta! (Enough!)"

In years past, Hispanos Unidos of Redwood City, California organized an annual Cinco de Mayo celebration with financial donations from both the tobacco and the beer industries. However, in 1991, this community-based organization took a stand and changed its policy. Unfortunately, the festival did not turn a profit at first, preventing the group from offering scholarships to Latino students as had been the tradition. However, Hispanos Unidos was steadfast in its decision. Their commitment won them recognition from the State of California. In a well attended news conference covering the state's award, Fernando Vega, president of Hispanos Unidos, states: "...the organization was not formed to make money; it was formed to better the community. I think by our very actions we are bettering the community." (Yañez, 1991.)

Thanks to the diligent work of Latino-led cross-substance coalitions like California Latino Alcohol and Other Drug Coalition (CAL-LADCO), and Latino Council on Alcohol and Tobacco (LCAT) other Cinco de Mayo festivals have followed in Hispanos Unidos footsteps. Some communities and organizations have also taken the initiative beyond Cinco de Mayo by refusing to accept organizational funding from these industries as well. The National Coalition of Hispanic Health and Human Services (COSSMHO), UCLA's Chicano Studies Department and Oakland's Clinica de La Raza have all adopted policies of not accepting funding from alcohol and tobacco companies.

Looking to the Future

Cross substance collaboration is here to stay. Community-based coalitions refused to be categorized and divided unnaturally in the face of the many complex and interconnected challenges of preventing substance abuse in their community. Funders and policymakers are learning from these multi-issue approaches and encouraging their expansion through increased opportunities for funding and support. With better funding has come some mechanisms for evaluation and documentation which, in turn, have surfaced important lessons.

Effective cross-substance coalitions have at least four things in common: a connection or stake in a particular community, a commitment to work together to address shared concerns, a

community focus that grounds alcohol and tobacco policy in the political and economic realities of their communities, and a world view that makes preeminent the need for communities to define issues holistically, based on the fundamental principle of the right of communities to determine the social context in which they live.

This grounding and commitment to community is an important resource for and a challenge to larger public health institutions. For example, community-based coalitions find their more nationally-focused funders and partners more reticent about taking on controversial issues and often provide disincentives for doing so. These disincentives can include threats to funding, increased oversight and administrative requirements and laborious documentation procedures. Yet, it was efforts to make substance abuse controversial and political that put these issues on the public agenda in the first place. Fear and ignorance of advocacy on the part of more beauracratic partners must be addressed through agency staff development, and better legal support to communities at the local level that help them define their relationship to these partners -- and gauge a more accurate sense of any legal risk associated with their activities.

As funders and others mandate collaboration between national policy groups and grassroots local coalitions, it is important that strategies are developed to constructively address the resulting tensions. As outlined above, much of these tensions arise from each group's historical roots as the civil rights movement of the 50s and 60s, community development and consumer rights efforts still have a profound impact on how prevention coalitions operate today. Most tensions between groups arise over appropriate tactics. It is important to recognize that there are many ways to approach organizing and media for policy change. Effective collaboration between local and national organizations respects local wisdom, cultural differences and the right of communities to choose their own leadership -- while playing to the strengths of each partner. For example, these collaborations tend to work best when national organizations: 1) focus on supporting the development of communication infrastructures between local groups; 2) leverage national contacts to focus national attention on local activities as the building blocks (and legitimacy) of any national movement; and 3) provide research, technical assistance and some training (when appropriate) to support local efforts on the ground.

Of course, mutual respect and attention to power dynamics are mandatory if such collaborations are to succeed. The dominance of whites in national leadership with little cultural competency or background in community-based organizing is a real barrier to forging successful coalitions between national public health organizations and more diverse, advocacy oriented locals. The increasing numbers of state and county funded coalitions that simply replicate national approaches are also a challenge as grassroots organizations are often pressed to join forces with these better funded mainstream counterparts only to face the same battles around tactics, issue definition and power relations. Fortunately, there are some organizations that have found better, more humane ways of building coalitions.

The Healthy Neighborhoods Program (HNP) of Contra Costa County, California is one such example. The county's Tobacco Prevention Program Manager, Galen Ellis, is a long time organizer and activist who has extensive organizing experience at the community level. She hired an African American woman, Sheryl Walton, who was also grounded in over a decade of public health organizing and community-based work. HNP hired residents from the targeted neighborhoods who were active in local coalitions, thereby building bridges between the county and local organizations by providing these groups with much needed support.

Though administered under Tobacco Prevention, HNP was designed to support the non-categorical, holistic view that residents had of public health. Residents chose what issues they were

to take up through an extensive, door-to-door survey and canvassing process that culminated in community forums and community action. Central to the HNP approach, and others like it, is a commitment to supporting local leadership and direction while working together to address community needs as defined by the affected communities. This commitment has taken HNP into many new areas of work but in one main direction -- community development.

The Project is a model for how more bureaucratic, less diverse institutions can work with more diverse, grassroots organizations. Some key lessons:

Hiring diverse staff who understand community organizing and advocacy is important. Much of the tensions that occur in grassroots-national coalitions arise from a lack of understanding of the issues and demands of organizing at the community level. Experienced, culturally competent staff at the national level can make a real difference in shifting the relationship dynamic to a more positive, supportive framework.

Local groups must define their own leadership and the issues around which they work. The old "everybody get excited about this issue we chose here in Washington and write letters and make phone calls" approach has simply played out. Political education around the national policy picture is still important and vital. However, locals must cut the issues for their constituents in their own way if we are to ever have a vital, broad-based movement. National organizations have to learn to listen for opportunities to frame their issue within the context of local organizing efforts -- not hope that things go the other way around.

When local work is strong, we all benefit. Dynamic local coalitions like HNP, the Coalition Against Billboard Advertising of Alcohol and Tobacco or Baltimore City Wide Liquor Coalition are the foundation of the movement for better public health policy. Without vital local work, national work will flounder. Therefore, nurturing these efforts with funding, technical assistance and other forms of support will only help all of our efforts. Also, whatever we do to retrofit our organizations to make room for such grassroots leadership -- i.e., increase diversity, staff development and the like -- will engender the popular support we need to enact policies to improve the public's health.

Community-based efforts to fight predatory marketing have changed the face of alcohol and tobacco policy advocacy and provided a much needed infusion of new blood. As a result, national coalitions heretofore dominated by whites have been challenged to make diversity and inclusivity a priority in their planning and operations. While they have met this challenge with only limited success, it is important to recognize that national policy groups continue to serve an important role as intermediaries for media and technical assistance. Further, in the face of these challenges, there are collaborations that are working and should receive further study. In any case, one thing is clear: these collaborations have great potential which advocates have only begun to explore.

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